GCPSG-014 (2024)
Physical Security Considerations in Facility Design

1.1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide Government of Canada (GC) security personnel with guidance on the preparation of physical security design briefs and associated components and considerations for GC facilities; whether new construction or retrofit of existing spaces. This guide should be used in conjunction with a Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) and/or Threat-Based Design to determine specific needs. Specific technical details about security equipment are not discussed in this guide (such as types of door hardware or intrusion alarms).

This guide is intended to be used in conjunction with other published RCMP LSA guides which are available at Lead Security Agency for Physical Security.

1.2. Applicability

This guide is applicable for GC employees with the responsibility of the design, construction, or renovation of a GC building or facility. Additionally, this guide applies to security personnel assigned with the development of physical security design briefs to ensure relevant physical security considerations and standards are reported to the project manager and are built into the project at the earliest possible phase.

1.3. Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion in physical security systems

All employees of the Government of Canada (GC) have a responsibility to safeguard persons, information and assets of the GC. It is important that security policies and practices do not serve as barriers to inclusivity, but instead support and respect all GC personnel while ensuring appropriate security measures are maintained for the protection of GC personnel, assets, and information.

Initiatives to promote equality and inclusion among the diverse communities and heritages within the GC, should be respected in the development and maintenance of physical security systems. Departments and agencies should follow all GC legislation, policy and directives on Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) in the promotion of a fair and equitable work environment for all persons while ensuring they meet their mandated security responsibilities.

Departments and agencies should conduct a risk management exercise to ensure, that while the dignity of all is respected, the protection of GC information, assets, and personnel is maintained. All questions on EDI policies and directives should first be addressed to your responsible departmental authority.

1.4. Information Technology considerations

With the constantly evolving threat landscape, and the convergence of physical and information technology (IT) security, the requirement to assess the risk of any application and/or software connected to a network to operate and support equipment in GC controlled buildings is critical. Some examples of these control systems could be for items such as, but not limited to, security lighting, perimeter gates, doors, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), etc.

Before implementing any applications and/or software that will control and/or automate certain building functions, your departmental security requires the completion of a Security Assessment and Authorization (SA&A). This will ensure that the integrity and availability of the components the applications and/or software controls are maintained and that any risks highlighted will be mitigated. Starting the SA&A process early is highly recommended to ensure project delivery schedules are not affected. For more information on the SA&A process, please consult your departmental Security.

5.1. Threat and Risk Assessment

Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) is a process used to identify, analyze, and address observed vulnerabilities against known or anticipated threats, to establish the risk environment, and is an integral part of a department or agency's overall risk management strategy. TRAs vary in scope and application but this process can enable greater efficiency in identifying and resolving vulnerabilities throughout the entirety of a construction project. The RCMP LSA can provide additional information on the TRA process in GCPSG-022 (2024) Threat and Risk Assessment Guide or by contacting rcmp.lsa-grc.posm@rcmp-grc.gc.ca.

5.2. Threat-Based Design

Threat-Based Design is a profile of the type, composition, capabilities, methods, projected harm, and/or intensity of a deliberate, accidental, or natural threat upon which the security engineering and operations of a facility is based. This is based on principles found in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Design Basis Threat. Threat-based design is intended to eliminate or reduce the impact of threats attributed to vulnerabilities in the design or location of a facility; thus, both threat-based design and TRA should be used in tandem. The steps in Threat-Based Design are:

The results of this document as well as the TRA can be used to develop the security design brief for the facility.

5.3. Security Design Brief

The content of a Security Design Brief (SDB) will vary, depending on whether the department or agency is leasing existing facilities or constructing new GC-owned facilities. The level of detail normally provided in an SDB is general in nature; in order to provide maximum flexibility in the design process. The elements of a facility listed under Section 6. Physical security considerations in building design and Section 7. Safeguards are a selection of factors that should be included in any SDB. Additionally, these elements may have an interdependent relationship that should be highlighted, to reinforce the value of incorporating safeguards that may address multiple vulnerabilities or threats.

It is beneficial to cross-reference, or note, the recommendations of the TRA or threat-based design documents to the applicable recommendations in the SDB; as these are the corrective measures intended to minimize the vulnerability and risks reported in those processes. The SDB should begin with an introduction and purpose, followed by applicable design considerations and safeguards, and should conclude with any references and supporting documentation (such as the TRA and Threat-Based Design documents). Once completed, the SDB should be provided to the project manager and other relevant personnel.

Depending on the facility, there may be additional design considerations and/or safeguards that are not included in these aforementioned sections of this guide. It is up to the department or agency to determine, based on its findings from the facility's TRA and/or threat-based design document, what measures are required for a given facility and develop recommendations to remove or minimize vulnerabilities in the facility's design and construction.

5.4. Facility Security Assessment and Authorization process

Facility Security Assessment and Authorization (FSA&A) is a process by which organizations ensure that security assessments are performed on new and existing GC facilities and fit-up projects. The FSA&A process consists of five (5) phases:

• Initiation;
• Planning;
• Risk and Analysis;
• Implementation, Authorization and Ongoing Security Assessments, and;
• Decommissioning.

TRAs, Threat-Based Design, and SDB each fit into one of the phases of the FSA&A process. TRA and Threat-Based Design takes place in the Risk and Analysis phase, after which the SDB is developed during the Implementation, Authorization, and Ongoing Security Assessments phase. For more information on the FSA&A process, please consult GCPSG-016 - Guide to the Facility Security Assessment and Authorization Process.

5.5. Management summary

Due to the length of SDB, TRA, and Threat-Based Design documents, it is preferable to create a two (2) to three (3) page summary or briefing note, including supporting documentation, for project decision-makers. The management summary should only highlight the specific design concepts related to each major attribute listed in the brief. The intent is to assist senior managers in quickly capturing the important design ideas necessary for safeguarding the facility, as well as to enable a decision to proceed with the project.

6.1. Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery

Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery is based on the principle that the external and internal area of government facilities can be designed and managed to create conditions that, together with specific physical security control measures, will reduce the risk of harm to employees, protect against and detect unauthorized access or attempts to access, and activate effective response and recovery activities. For more information consult GCPSG-019 - Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery Guide.

6.2. Physical security zones

Physical security zones, when appropriately integrated, should enhance the overall security environment of a facility. Physical security zoning should promote a sense of ownership or territorial reinforcement, provide opportunities for natural surveillance, and establish a clearly defined sequence of boundaries through which an appropriately screened visitor or employee may pass through. Departmental functional space requirements should also be taken into consideration when establishing zoning boundaries.

Physical security zoning should not be implemented by simply adhering to the prescribed technical requirements for zones nor by integrating zones into the plan based solely on functional space requirements. If physical security measures that demarcate zones are excessive, inappropriate, or have not considered the functional space requirements, these measures will eventually be bypassed and could become ineffective. Incentives for unauthorized personnel to cross zoning boundaries (such as washrooms or a cafeteria) should be avoided or removed.

Refer to GCPSG-015 Guide to the Application of Physical Security Zones for more information on zoning.

6.3. Perimeter of building and property

Stand-off distance is important when considering the site/building perimeter as it allows for early detection of a threat which in turn allows for quick response and limits damaging effects on staff and infrastructure. The exact distance can vary based on a variety of factors and a TRA can aid in determining an appropriate distance. This should be considered in both the construction and/or relocation of a facility.

Fencing can be used for the perimeter of the site. For more information consult GCPSG-009 Security Fencing Considerations Guide.

With the exception of easements, the facility may have to abut the property line, a street or the wall of an adjacent building on some sites. If separation from the property line cannot be achieved, more robust security features and procedures will be required. For more information consult GCPSG-019 - Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery Guide.

6.4. Life safety and emergencies

While physical security measures are required, they must not supersede nor negate life safety measures or legal requirements. For example, Security Zones (SZ) and High Security Zones (HSZ) still require the ability to exit in an emergency; therefore, emergency exit doors must still be equipped with panic bar hardware to expedite emergency egress. Refer to all applicable codes and policies including, but not limited to, the Canada Labour Code, National Fire Code of Canada, National Building Code of Canada, Provincial/Territorial/ Municipal codes, and relevant TBS policies to ensure compliance.

6.5. Location of exit stairwells

Exit stairwells which form part of a means of egress must comply with the National Building Code requirements. These stairwells should not allow any uncontrolled access to Operations Zone (OZ), SZ, or HSZ. Best practice is for doors in a SZ and HSZ to exit to a less restrictive zone prior to accessing a public space without exterior door hardware capable of granting access into the zone.

6.6. Elevators and elevator lobbies

Elevators, including freight/cargo elevators and dumbwaiters, should not allow access between zones. Elevators should only allow access between the same zones (Reception Zone to Reception Zone). Elevator lobbies, including freight/cargo elevators from public parking and loading docks, should open in a Public Zone (PZ) or Reception Zone (RZ) such as a ground floor elevator lobby to ensure only authorized, appropriately screened individuals are allowed access into a facility's space. Should the elevators open into an OZ, there is a greater possibility of unauthorized individuals accessing the GC space undetected.

6.7. Pedestrian circulation routes

Pedestrian circulation routes from PZ to OZ should pass through a RZ under the institution's control to ensure control of access; as per GCPSG-015 - Application of Physical Security Zones Guide. All stairs required as a means of egress for PZ should be located in the PZ.

Exit doors as a means of egress from restricted-access areas (RAA) to PZ should be equipped with automatic closers and secured on the stairwell or corridor side, with the exception of crossover floors in high-rise buildings. Signs on doors from higher-restriction zones should indicate one-way movement or other appropriate signage.

Any security measures that are used to compensate for site-specific deficiencies are to be included in SDB. Electronic access control can be used to regulate the movement of personnel around the facility.

6.8. Pedestrian control within a building

Sufficient space should be provided in RZ to accommodate visitors waiting for service while not disrupting normal activity in the facility or on premises. Sufficient overflow space in PZ may also be used to ensure normal operations can continue in the event of a sudden influx of visitors. At the perimeter of the institution's space, there should be the potential to erect a physical or psychological barrier as a means of access control in a situation such as a protest or shelter in place event. For more information, consult GCPSG-006 Access Management Guide.

6.9. Windows

Windows should follow architectural requirements with consideration on security and safety glazing included in the design phase of the project. Refer to GCPSG-013 Fundamentals of Glazing in Physical Security for more information and specifications.

6.10. Common spaces

All common functions within the building should be located in centralized areas. These areas should be part of an OZ and could include, for example, lunch/coffee rooms, washrooms and general photocopy rooms. Common areas for visitors such as washrooms, interview rooms and orientation spaces should be located in the RZ. The intent is to reduce pedestrian movement into RAAs, and to eliminate reasons for persons not working in the RAAs to enter legitimately.

6.11. Washrooms

Public washrooms should be located where there is unobstructed visual observation of the entry by a receptionist or guard. Staff washrooms, if indicated in a TRA, can be located in an OZ. Staff washrooms should be separate from public washrooms for employee safety and to minimize the possibility of unauthorized access to any RAA.

6.12. Utility spaces

Service and utility entrance and exit points (such as air intakes, mechanical ducts, roof hatches and water supplies) must be safeguarded to ensure that the facility's critical assets, life safety measures and departmental programs are not compromised by unauthorized or uncontrolled access.

Utility spaces should not be located adjacent to entrances to more restrictive zones. If possible, they can be located near intended access management locations such as guard screening areas.

6.13. Adjacent occupants

Access to an institution's space should be controlled. The impact of departmental operations on adjacent occupants should be considered. Likewise, the mandate and operations of adjacent occupants should also be taken into consideration in relation to departmental mandate and operations.

In a multi-tenant building with GC offices spanning several floors, elevator systems that separate floor access in the lobby can help prevent unauthorized access to GC space(s) depending on the elevator bank, access cards, and management of visitors by security personnel. For more information consult GCPSG-006 - Access Management Guide.

6.14. Telecommunications and data links within the facility

A TRA should be used to determine appropriate physical security measures for telecom wiring within a facility. Additional information can be found in the Policy on Service and Digital.

The need to implement protective measures within the facility, such as emergency power for the intercom or internal telephone and the routing of conduit to carry communications should be determined by the TRA and/or Threat-Based Design. For more information refer to Appendix C of GCPSG-015 (2023) - Guide to the Application of Physical Security Zones.

6.15. Mailrooms

Mailrooms should be managed as an OZ at minimum. Mailrooms should be located in or near a shipping/receiving area separate from RAAs or critical infrastructure. They should be separate from RZs and have the capability to be isolated from the rest of the building in case of suspicious packages or other threats.

6.16. Loading docks

Loading docks should be located away from and not directly linked or adjacent to RAAs or critical infrastructure components. While shipping and receiving areas can be located in the same loading dock, it is beneficial to physically separate the areas to limit the impact of a threat actor should they gain access.

6.17. Conference and board rooms

Conference and board rooms should be located in an OZ at minimum. If these spaces are to be used to discuss sensitive or classified information, they should be included in the design of the zones with additional sound attenuation and appropriate access management.

6.18. Computer and server rooms

Physical security as it pertains to computer server rooms is based on the implementation of positive control. Under positive control, a space or asset is actively monitored and continuously protected so that any change, or attempted change, to its status is immediately known. Computer and server rooms should be managed as RAAs, with best practice being limiting access to essential personnel only. For facilities housing classified servers, these RAAs must be located in a SZ. For more information refer to Appendix C of GCPSG-015 (2023) - Guide to the Application of Physical Security Zones.

6.19. Special purpose space

This document focuses on attributes associated with general-purpose office buildings. Spaces such as medical facilities, classrooms, laboratories, and workshops should be listed on the physical security design brief with the appropriate safeguards as determined by a TRA and/or threat-based design analysis. More information and examples can be found in GCPSG-015 - Application of Physical Security Zones Guide.

7.1. Site safeguards

Site safeguards are implemented for the site, or geographic location, of the facility. These safeguards are outside of the facility and are focused on the site itself and its features. This section is intended to be used in conjunction with guidance from GCPSG-019 - Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery Guide, GCPSG-015 - Application of Physical Security Zones Guide, GCPSG-006 - Access Management Guide, and other listed GCPSGs when compiling an SDB for a facility.

7.2. Building safeguards

There are a variety of building safeguards that can be implemented to protect GC assets and employees, with findings from TRAs and Threat Based Design determining the which safeguard(s) may be required for a given facility and any specific requirements. Best practice is to use a combination of the following safeguards for a holistic, reliable security system (for example, utilizing Electronic Access Control and Electronic Intrusion Detection with a secure storage room to control access and detect potential unauthorized access attempts).

This section is intended to be used in conjunction with guidance from GCPSG-019 - Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery Guide, GCPSG-015 - Application of Physical Security Zones Guide, GCPSG-006 - Access Management Guide, and other listed GCPSGs when compiling an SDB for a facility.

Reviewed and recommended for approval.

I have reviewed and hereby recommend, GCPSG-014 (2024) - Physical Security Considerations in Facility Design, for approval.

Tim R Murphy
Manager (Acting), RCMP Lead Security Agency

Date: 2024-07-17

Approved

I hereby approve GCPSG-014 (2024) - Physical Security Considerations in Facility Design.

Andre St-Pierre
Director, RCMP Physical Security

Date: 2024-07-18